This article examines the discursive appeal of Podemos, an allegedly left-wing "populist party" in Spain, to European Union (EU) 
Introduction
The last three decades have been times of disturbance for the stability of the two-party system in Europe.
New parties -environmental focused, far right-wing or left-wing, niche parties -have emerged challenging the usual political discourses and the distribution of electoral opportunities (Meguid, 2005: 347; Dahlström and Sundell, 2012: 353-354) . The Eurocrisis and its political management at the European and domestic level have generated additional opportunities for new political agents, especially in Southern Europe (Eder, 2014; Deutschmann, 2014) This paper focuses on the emergence of the political party Podemos in Spain and its discursive appeal toward EU issues. This party is analysed under the lens of the concept of populism and prior studies on populist parties. Populism is defined in this paper as a type of political discourse and it is fundamentally understood as a two-dimensional phenomenon with a rhetorical and social -the object of the appeal - There is extensive literature on right-wing populist parties and their appeal against the European Union; these studies connect with research focused on Euroscepticism although in occasions the last is separated from the specific analysis of populist phenomena (see Ford, Goodwin and Cutts, 2012; Bertoncini and Delors, 2014) . However, few studies have studied the discourse of left-wing populist parties on the EU and its historical formation in a systematic way (apart from . In this vein, the present study aims at empirically substantiating the discursive formation of the party Podemos on the EU.
The analysis is threefold: (1) first, crucial points of rupture of the hegemonic discourse towards the EU in the Spanish political system are identified and analysed (2) second, the impact of these points of rupture on key political structures in the country is discussed and (3) finally, the discourse of Podemos on the EU is substantiated in its rhetorical and discursive dimension. The study of the case of Podemos may contribute to a better understanding of the phenomenon of populism, particularly left-wing populism, and its discursive approach to the EU. The discourse analysis conducted in this research is based on the theoretical and empirical developments of the Essex School of discourse analysis, 13 departing from the seminal work of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau "Hegemony and socialist strategy" in 1985. This paper uses the analytical tools provided to understand a populist discourse and identify the different articulatory practices constituting the central categories of a populist appeal.
14 12 For a full discussion and definition of populism see the section below "A populist challenger in Spain?" 13 In addition to Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau, other significant scholars of the Essex School are Aletta Norval, David Howarth, Jason Glynos or Yannis Stavrakakis. 14 Some useful manuals for this purpose have been edited. The more elaborated are "Discourse Analysis: Varieties and Methods" of Jason Glynos, David Howarth, Aletta Norval, Ewen Speed (2009) and Yannis Stavrakakis et.al (2014) "Methodological orientation internal technical report".
Populism and the EU
"...no political movement will be entirely exempt from populism, because none will fail to interpellate to some extent the 'people' against an enemy, through the construction of a social frontier" (Laclau, 2005a: 47) .
The literature on European populism is generally devoted to the description of either the populist parties'
rhetoric (Albertazzi and Mc Donnel, 2007; Hartleb, 2012, Vasilopaulou, Halikiopoulou and Exadaktylos, 2014) or the facilitating and constraining conditions under which populist political parties may emerge (Hartleb, 2012; Malone, 2014, Kriesi and Pappas, 2015) . Most of this research focuses exclusively on right-wing populist parties and its main goal is to highlight key features of political discourses or political styles to grasp the nature and characteristics of the populist phenomenon. For instance, Genga analyses the discourse of the Front National in France concluding that it is based on the cleavage of clash of civilizations, thus reformulating a postmodern version of nationalism. The contribution of Vasilopaulou and associates shows a sophisticated and detailed methodological approach (framing analysis) in the study of populism within the Greek political system.
They distinguish between mainstream populism and fringe populism in Greek politics and conclude that populism is an "embedded ideological feature of Greek politics" (Vasilopaulou et.al., 2014: 400) . Rovira
Kaltwasser and Mudde conduct a comparative analysis between European and Latin-American populist parties in order to determine the ideological differences between them. They also differentiate between right-wing and left-wing populist parties. These authors use crucial dichotomies such as inclusionexclusion and identity-economy to draw relevant conclusions about the differences and similarities of several European and Latin-American populist parties (Rovira Kaltwasser and Mudde, 2011) . Scholars more concerned with political opportunities explaining the emergence of populist agents, focus on the role of structural changes and social and political mobilizations (Fella, 2008; Jansen, 2011; Roberts, 2014) .
Research on populism and the EU has been mostly restricted to the analysis and classification of Eurosceptic parties and its opposition to European Integration (see Ford, Goodwin and Cutts, 2012; Grabow and Hartleb, 2013; Hillebrand, 2014; Bertoncini and Delors, 2014) . In this vein, Senninger and
Wagner analyse the Austrian case to determine how parties talk about the EU in national elections, also evaluating the salience of European issues in the political discourses. Contrary to their expectations, they find that Eurosceptic parties do not address more frequently EU issues than mainstream parties (Senninger and Wagner, 2015: 8 explore new left-wing populist parties in relation to the EU, and there is also a striking lack of analysis on the specific political discourses of these parties on EU issues. This study contributes to the development of research on populism and the EU, navigating between the fields of comparative politics and international relations.
A populist challenger in Spain?
When exploring a populist phenomenon, the terminological question of whether the adjective populist is adequate for the case or not takes an especial relevance due to the high normative charge of the term.
Thus, the characterization of an agent as populist must be supported by solid theoretical foundations and certain empirical substantiation. There are two distinct strategies to fulfil this objective: one consists in analysing the rhetorical attributes of a given political agent to define the populist character of its appeal. Following this path, most of students of populism ground in the minimal definition proposed by Cas Mudde whereby populism is defined as a thin-centred ideology:
"that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite,' and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people" (Mudde 2004: 543) The implications of defining populism as an ideology are not completely clear in the elaboration of Another group of students of populism uses a different strategy and rely upon what might be called an historical perspective. One of the major exponents of this stream of research, Ernesto Laclau, conceives populism as a political logic and a particular mode of articulation of the social (Laclau, 2001 (Laclau, [1985 : 33-34).
This specific mode of articulating heterogeneous social identities is based on an appeal to "the people"
against the "other" -corrupt elites but also other actors -and the irruption of subaltern or excluded sectors in the public space (Barros, 2006: 71) . This occurs through a process of dichotomization of the political space between certain type of elites -representatives of the status quo -and the people. In this conception of populism the opposition between the elites and the people is continues to be central but Laclau and the Essex school scholars include, in addition, a social dimension into the analysis. In accordance to Laclau, there is no successful populist appeal without the previous construction of chains of equivalence among non-satisfied social demands.
This paper conceives populism as a type of political discourse that may show evidence in each of the dimensions described above; that is, in the rhetorical dimension of populism -in as much as it shapes words, sentences and the composition of texts and utterances of particular political actors -; and also, following Laclau and Mouffe, the traces of populism can be found in the changes of social aggregation and formation of equivalential chains between social demands in a broader social sphere -. Thus, with the goal to achieve a minimal consensus on the fundamental traits of the concept, this paper defines populism as a type of political discourse that should be contextualized social and historically and that can be associated to various populist subjects and specific situations of crisis. This political discourse entails four constitutive components (Ben Stanley, quoted in Van Kessel, 2014: 101) :
• The existence of two homogeneous units of analysis: 'the people' and 'the elite'.
• The antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite.
• The idea of popular sovereignty.
• The positive valorization of 'the people' and denigration of 'the elite'.
To sum up, the case of Podemos and its characterization as a populist agent revolve around two theoretical assumptions: first, the rhetorical features of this specific political agent -the aforementioned antagonism between the people (in Spanish la gente, la mayoria social) and the elites and the defence of a popular will -; second, the contextual crisis of representation that implies an, at least latent, populist identification of specific social sectors with empty and unifying signifiers.
Dislocation and points of rupture
Studying populism from a discursive perspective implies, when discourse is taken seriously, that the analysis expands beyond the rhetoric and looks at how the object of the appeal is also in construction in the turbulent terrain of the social. Thereby, and following the path of all discourse-oriented analysts, "the people" is not a passive object but rather a subject involved in its constitution. This notion of the people in construction opens up a terrain for further characterizations of what does this process consist of and how does it take place. The Essex School scholars have revealed some preconditions for the construction of the people from a discursive perspective (see Laclau, 2005b or Katsambekis, 2016 . One of these preconditions is a certain crisis of representation as a prelude of a populist articulation. In a discourseoriented approach, the will of the represented is not reflected or transposed in the representative bodies or subjects; it is on the contrary constituted, at least partially, in the very process of representation (Laclau, 2005b: 157-62) . This is, in fact, the process to constitute hegemonic orders, political and discursive, that never are completely fixed or closed. This precarious order of the system of representation can be altered by specific dislocations and the proliferation of non-satisfied demands and non-represented subjects. In words of Mouffe and Laclau the non-satisfied demands equate to non-fixed elements that can, eventually, be articulated by alternative discourses (2005b: 105).
"...articulation refers to the signifying mechanism through which elements are incessantly transformed to moments of distinct discourses in an attempt to (partially) fix their meaning and crystallize identities." (Stavrakakis, Kioupkiolis, Katsambekis, Siomos, Garefi, 2014: 17) The dislocation of the order, operating as a precondition for the populist articulation, can be produced by extra-discursive events such as economic crises, corruption or key shocking events (Katsambekis, 2016: 393; Roberts, 2014: 681-92) . There is an ongoing discussion on whether populism can be identified as a side effect of crisis or, conversely, it is a phenomenon independent of the dislocations and crisis of the political systems. This paper does not aim at solving this dilemma but rather argues that populism, as a type of political discourse, tends to strongly emerge in situations of dislocation or crisis. Thus, specific points of rupture can be identified and alternative discursive articulation evaluated in its process to ensemble the non-fixed elements through nodal points (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014: 122) . In other words, even when a mechanic cause-effect relationship between crisis and populism is not advocated here, the exploration of the contextual features favouring specific populist articulations is seen in this study as an inescapable step in any thorough analysis of the populist phenomenon. Accordingly, this paper argues that the disruptive processes of Europeanization in Spain during the hard years of the crisis were crucial for the dislocation of the hegemonic discursive order on the EU (see Roch González, 2017) . The pending question is how did Podemos, the allegedly populist agent in Spain, incorporate and articulate discursively the EU elements within its populist master frame, with the characteristic nodal points and empty signifiers. 
Methods
This case of study uses methodological tools from discourse-oriented analyses of populism, especially those influenced by Laclaunian theorizations and the further developments of the Essex School. The main goal is to identify points of rupture, in Laclau's words, that may shape the character and content of the populist articulation of Podemos in regards to the EU. The discourse of Podemos is, in a second step, analyzed to determine the position and characterization of the EU in its populist articulation. It is far from the scope of this study to make empirical generalizations about the discourse of left-wing populist parties on the EU; conversely, it attempts to provide a thick description and discourse analytical data for contributing to the ongoing cross national analysis and comparison of populist agents in Europe and beyond.
17 Following Laclau, nodal points and empty signifiers are crucial figures to facilitate the populist articulation: "Terms such as 'the unity of the people', the 'welfare of the country', and so forth, as something that antagonistic political forces claim to ensure through totally different political means, have to be necessarily empty in order to constitute the aims of a political competition. They are alternative terms to refer to the plenitude of a fully fledged communitarian order as something which is absent and which has to be achieved" (Laclau, 1994: 37) .
In a first step, key points of rupture of the hegemonic discursive order on the EU in Spain are identified and evaluated. The second part of the analysis is devoted to the study of Podemos' discourse on the EU and how is it integrated in a broader populist discourse. 
Points of rupture of the hegemonic discourse on the EU
There are some events during the hard years of the economic crisis in Spain that changed significantly the relationship of the EU with Spanish authorities and also the configuration of the imaginary about the EU in the Spanish public sphere and the political system (for a detailed analysis see Roch González, equally supported by the two main parties in Spain (PSOE and PP). These events illustrate a political phenomenon studied by some Europeanization scholars: the convergence of the mainstream parties, socialists and conservatives, with specific varieties in each country (see Mair, 2007 or Ladrech, 2009 ). This process finds parallels in the case of Greece, as it is explained in Katsambekis (2016) or . In the text of the constitutional reform -a balanced-budget amendment -there are words equivalent to fiscal sustainability such as budgetary stability: In particular, these recommendations invite Spain to: 1) introduce a taxation system consistent with the fiscal consolidation efforts and more supportive to growth, 2) ensure less tax-induced bias towards indebtedness and home-ownership, 3) implement the labour market reforms, 4) take additional measures to increase the effectiveness of active labour market policies, 5) take additional measures to open up professional services, reduce delays in obtaining business licences, and eliminate barriers to doing business, 6) complete the electricity and gas interconnections with neighbouring countries, and address the electricity tariff deficit in a comprehensive way.
20
These pieces of evidence shed light on the disrupting character of Europeanization processes in Spain during the period 2010-12. The Europeanization of Spanish politics was governed by a general austerity discourse; its logic and categories -fiscal consolidation, budgetary stability, fiscal sustainability -underlie the proliferation of legal texts establishing rules and policies with specific meanings and directions. This austerity discourse can be described in similar terms than those used by Radealli to refer to the "master discourse" of competitiveness in the frame of the Open Method of Coordination and the Lisbon Treaty (Radaelli, 2003: 7) . As it can be seen in Figure 1 , the dramatic drop in the trust and the positive image of the various stages of the party must be conducted. This paper aims at grasping an initial reaction and deployment of the discourse in the specific context of the emergence of the party and the European elections campaign, from January to May 2014. This is relevant due to two main reasons: first, it captures the initial and allegedly pure populist appeal of the party (Gomez Reino and Llamazares, 2015) and second, it covers the European elections campaign when EU topics are more likely to be salient in the general political discourse of the party. Thus, the European elites are constructed in this specific context, as evil and foreign economic and political elites and tend to be described as an extension of the national elites or vice versa. As it can be seen above in the speech of the leader of the party, Pablo Iglesias, the dichotomization of the social space is made through two signifiers: democracy and the "Casta". This last term has been already used by leaders such as Beppe Grillo of the Movimento 5 Stelle and represents the political, economic, and media establishment. The second movement of Podemos is identifying the content and dynamics, on the one hand of the signifier "Casta" and on the other hand, of "democracy". The "Casta" is due to be filled with specific actors, properties of the actors, relationships and aspirations. In the excerpt of the same speech shown below, the signifier "Casta" is filled with specific names of parties or party leaders across Europe; they basically represent two party families: the social-democratic and the conservative family. they should compare with themselves, with that "Casta" who end up in boards of directors of companies, with that "Casta" who grant pardon to bankers..." [Pablo Iglesias, Ibid] .
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The elites' category, in this case the "Casta", is constituted with a mixture of socioeconomic and territorial components. "La patria", or the homeland, and as a by-product the people, is placed continuously in the discourse of Podemos in an antagonistic position against the elites. In order to constitute this frontier between the people and the elites the territorial divide is used but without ethnic or racial components; the "Casta" belongs rather to a set of more or less dispersed and cosmopolitan transnational actors.
Constructing the people
The "Casta" is constructed in the discourse of Podemos through an antagonist relation with "the people". As it has been described above, the "Casta" is formed by mainly political mainstream actors, that is, social-democrats and conservatives; the other option stressed in the discourse of Pablo Iglesias is democracy. In the discourse of Podemos, democracy is "the power of the people" and "the people" can be constituted through the active identification with the party and the leader, Pablo Iglesias, the opposition to the elites and the generation of an equivalential chain among particular demands.
"Democracy" is the empty signifier par excellence in the discourse of Podemos, with the goal of integrating the set of plural demands emerging at least since the 15-M movement in Spain. In the general discourse of Podemos the people is represented by the following signifiers: the people ("la gente") the social majority or the citizens.
"What we are saying is what the majority of the people think, the majority of the people want to have a decent health system, the majority of the people want to have a decent education system, the majority of the people want the rich to sometimes pay taxes, the majority of the people love their country and want to keep dignity up" [Pablo Iglesias in a campaign event for the European elections in Albacete]
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The "people" is also expanded, to be constructed in an antagonist relation with the elites or the "Casta", a transnational group of politicians with connections with the economic elites. In this case, the "people" is formed not only through the opposition to the elites but also through the distinction from "an institutionalised other", in words of Laclau (2005b: 117) , representing alien or floating demands; these demands and their meaning are in dispute and can be incorporated to alternative equivalential chains (Laclau, 2005: 131) . Thus, the equivalential chain needed for the constitution of the people is always limited to a specific sector of the society that aims at representing the whole community. Podemos defines the people and the constitution of an equivalential chain at that point, as something restricted to South The antagonism between the people and the elites is constructed on the basis of specific divides, operating the logic of difference for such purpose. In the context of the European elections, the combination of socioeconomic and territorial divides is used to generate this antagonism. The separation between South European citizens and other citizens or elites indicates a territorial divide used to construct the people. This divide operates in combination with the socioeconomic division between the economic elites and the normal or decent people:
Corruption is a way to govern that allows who does not run for elections to rule. The economic elites that have enough power, using threats, using their influence or using briefcases full of 500 Euros bills that go to the main political parties' headquarters [Pablo Iglesias, Ibid]. 
Europe as a floating signifier
The signifier "Europe" is also integrated in this populist articulation in a dichotomist and antagonist way.
In relation to the constitution of the nodal points the "elites" and the "people", Europe plays an ambivalent role with two meanings associated to each of the antagonistic poles. In the case of the elites, there is one Europe of banks, financial institutions and non-accountable politicians. On the other hand, in the case of the people, there is a Europe of social rights, of South European and decent citizens.
We want the majority of the people to say clearly we can!, we can do politics ourselves, we want dignity for our countries, we want dignity for our people, we want a future for our children and that future can be in Europe but not with a currency and with a central bank without democratic control serving the banks. We do not want a Europe serving the rich and the banks but serving the citizens and that is called democracy [Pablo Iglesias in a campaign event for the European elections in Albacete] 31 Thereby, Europe appears in the discourse of Podemos primarily as a floating signifier, in the sense that it can be appropriated by many actors and filled with several meanings and directions; but, at the same time, it is functioning as an empty signifier in as much as allows for the development of an equivalential chain among specific South European "peoples". 
Concluding remarks
In contrast to the Europhile Spanish political system, the emergence of the political party Podemos during the European elections campaign served to illuminate some points of rupture in the hegemonic view on the EU. The dislocation of the symbolic and political order has been described in this paper in terms of a "disruptive Europeanization" taking place in Spain during the hard years of the crisis (Roch Gonzalez, 2017) . Therefore, the dislocation of the Spanish political system was, in part, triggered by disruptive Europeanization processes. This fact, together with contextual factors such as the European elections and party-internal and ideological factors, allowed for a specific integration of EU elements in the populist articulation of Podemos. These floating elements, detached from the hegemonic articulation on the EU, permit the emergence of new discursive formations with counter-hegemonic purposes.
The research has also shown that the discourse of Podemos on EU issues is integrated in more general articulatory populist practices. Thereby, two main signifiers have been identified as nodal points of the discourse of Podemos: the "Casta" and "Democracy". The antagonistic relationship between the "people" and the "elites" is articulated on the basis of these two signifiers. The analysis reveals how the people and the elites -in this case the "Casta" and "Democracy" -are Europeanized, that is, expanded as elastic signifiers to incorporate content from EU issues. The "Casta" is expanded in order to encompass transnational and European elites and allow for the integration of EU elements in the discourse. The elites appear as a homogeneous group separated from the people by territorial and socioeconomic divides. However, the discourse of Podemos differs significantly from the classical Eurosceptic parties in Europe since there are no racial or ethnic elements in its discursive articulation.
Europe functions in the discourse of Podemos as a floating signifier; Podemos makes visible the floating character of Europe and its potential connections -equivalential chain -either with more "democratic" demands or with the "Casta". This coheres perfectly with prior theorizations of Laclau in which "...the floating dimension becomes more visible in periods of organic crisis, when the symbolic system needs to be radically recast " (2005b: 132) . The hegemony of the symbolic order on the EU in Spain was challenged by a structural moment of dislocation and the emergence of a new articulatory agent. In general, therefore, it seems that "Democracy" represents in the discourse of Podemos the empty signifier moment -with this integrating and articulating function in regards to particular demands -whereas "Europe" represents the floating signifier moment -signalling the hegemonic struggle on how to fix the meaning of such particular demands -. Thus, Europe is subdivided into two meanings to highlight on the one hand, the hitherto hegemonic articulation of democracy in a liberal version, with traditional actors (mainly social-democrats and conservatives), economic transnational actors and part of the civil society; on the other hand Europe, with its alternative meaning as a democracy of "the people", of social rights and of south European citizens signals the emergence of a counter-hegemonic articulation. Laclau conceives the empty and floating moment as different dimensions of the same hegemonic struggle whereby:
"the first concerns the construction of a popular identity once the presence of a stable frontier is taken for granted; the second try conceptually to apprehend the logic of the displacement of that frontier" (Laclau, 2005b:133) The scope of this study was limited in terms of time-dimension and actor-centre explanation. The discourse of Podemos on the EU was only explored during an initial period in the European elections campaign and it limits the ability to infer conclusions about the overall discourse of Podemos on the EU -even though it illuminates an important moment of emergence of the party -. Consequently, the selection of this period affects the salience of EU issues in the general discourse of Podemos; such salience is, in turn, determined by (1) the audience object of the speech -a restricted or expanded public -, (2) the general political and economic context and (3) the internal strategy of the party. The analysis of this variance of the salience and direction of EU issues in the discourse of Podemos should be addressed in future studies. The analysis of the speeches of the leader of the party implies an assumption about the representativeness of the leader in the case of Podemos. Even when the centrality of Pablo Iglesias in the European elections -Podemos' ballot papers were illustrated with a picture of the leader -is unquestionable, a finer analysis should incorporate different voices in the construction of the political discourse of Podemos.
Notwithstanding the relatively limited scope, this work offers valuable insights into the articulatory practices of populist parties, especially left-wing populist parties, in regards to EU elements. It offers evidence on how the master populist discourse can integrate diverse elements in its antagonistic form. A natural progression of this work is to analyse how these practices are consistent across left-wing populist parties in Europe and how they can be differentiated from traditional Eurosceptic parties or new rightwing populist parties.
